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T hese, then, were the situations of our four men at the start of a decade when an Iowa background could serve as a 
preparatory course for success. Why was it of 
value?
The 1930s were a mixed bag of experiences; 
the decade left memories of extremely diverse 
people, institutions, and events. There were 
Will Rogers and Father Coughlin; Joe DiMag- 
gio and Joe Louis; Huey Long and Norman 
Thomas; John Dillinger and William Randolph 
Hearst; Albert Einstein’s flight from Germany 
and Jesse Owens’ triumphs there; the Maginot 
Line, the Munich Pact, and the Abraham Lin­
coln Brigade; Wrong Way Corrigan and Sally 
Rand; the Lindbergh kidnapping and the 
Scottsboro case; Prohibition’s repeal, flagpole 
sitters, and dance marathons. But mainly it was 
th e decade of the NRA and WPA; the 
Townsend Plan and the Supreme Court fight; 
the Bonus March and apples for sale on street- 
corners; ‘Brother, Can You Spare a Dime?’ 
and The Grapes of Wrath. The Depression— 
that was the story.
And that meant Iowans had some advan­
tages. To start with, they had advantages be­
cause of what they were not: Iowans were not 
likely to be prominent in fields where success 
was improbable in the Thirties. For example, 
big-business types were rare in Iowa. Historian 
William Miller and others have shown that 
such men tended to emerge from big, indus­
trialized cities; small chance of that in Iowa! But 
big business was not in good repute in the 
Thirties, with formerly prestigious figures like 
Henry Ford and Samuel Insull now associated 
with labor goons and stolen money. (Obviously 
Hoover had ties to big business; let us ascribe 
that to the California influence.) All in all, the 
unlikelihood of an Iowan’s dominance in the 
business world did not much diminish his 
chances for fame in the 1930s.
For another example, military and naval 
leaders rarely hailed from Iowa. Of the sixty- 
four Americans listed in Roger Parkinson’s En-
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cyclopedia of Modern War, only one—Admiral 
William D. Leahy, who had been born in 
Hampton—was an Iowan, and Leahy was a 
naval diplomat rather than a “fighting admiral. 
(None of the sixty-four, incidently, was born in 
the other upper midwestern states: Illinois, 
Wisconsin, Minnesota, the Dakotas, or Ne­
braska.) But, again, military and naval figures 
were not much admired in the 1930s. Many 
Americans had become so disenchanted with 
the results of World War I that they now re­
coiled at the thought of any past or future mili­
tary intervention overseas. In consequence, 
the prestige of military men sank to perhaps its 
lowest point in American history during the 
1930s, and they exerted no influence on basic 
national policy until very late in the decade.
What the Thirties called for, rather, were 
men who could cope with hard times. And in 
hard times, food becomes a vital concern in a 
way that it is not during prosperity. Iowans, 
having grown up with what historian Frank 
Freidel aptly called “the ample demonstration 
oí abundance and the promise of even greater 
abundance from the Iowa soil, were 
shocked—not just startled, but morally 
offended—by what the Depression meant: a 
scarcity of the elemental necessities of life. 
Being expert in the production and distribution 
of food, Iowans felt qualified to do something 
about this monstrous condition. In the disas­
trous Thirties, Hoover, Lewis, Wallace, and 
Hopkins all assumed the role of providers.
Of course, the four men brought differing 
expertise and differing points of view to that 
role. With their complementary skills, one 
could imagine them forming a well-integrated 
corporate team: Wallace providing research; 
Hoover, management; Lewis, labor; and Hop­
kins, distribution. True, one cannot readily 
imagine their agreeing on methods. The four 
would have agreed that all men and women 
were entitled to some equitable share of life’s 
needs. But the relatively conservative Hoover 
and Lewis emphasized the part that individual
toil played in achieving rewards. Hoover ex­
pected enlightened and rational people to 
cooperate voluntarily for mutual benefit. Lewis 
might not have disputed this, though he clearly 
expected workers to exercise their collective 
muscle if a fair share was denied them. Wallace 
and Hopkins, on the other hand, had spent 
much of their professional lives during the 
1920s watching the diligent efforts of men and 
women come to naught on farms and in slums, 
and they felt government was obliged to help 
people who were in real need. Still, the four 
had more in common than their obvious politi­
cal differences suggest: their Iowa upbringing, 
rural or small town; their marriages, three out 
of four to Iowa women; their exposure to seri­
ous religious guidance, whether expressed in a 
work ethic, charitable duty, or both; their 
interest in education, and exclusively Iowa 
schooling for three out of four; and their politi­
cal acumen and ambitions—for all four, at one 
time or another, aspired to the presidency. 
And of course there were personal connec­
tions, with the two older men and the two 
younger sometimes operating in close or loose
alliance.
T he Depression decade began with one of our Iowans, Herbert Hoover, in the White House. The year 1930 dawned 
dark and grew darker, but Hoover still moved 
confidently. Calling Congress into special ses­
sion in April 1929, he had pushed through the 
Agricultural Marketing Act, designed to aid 
farmers in a period which still looked generally 
prosperous. Now in 1930 he persuaded dozens 
of trade associations to pledge to maintain wage 
levels and engage in new investment. He 
signed the Hawley-Smoot Tariff into law, in­
creasing agricultural and other duties; and the 
Federal Farm Board swung into action, form­
ing government corporations to purchase 
surplus wheat and cotton. Before the stock 
market crash, he had inveighed against the 
prevailing easy credit that had fueled specu-
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lation, and he had instituted a tight-money pol- gressmen out of office by the score, and 
icy to dampen it. Now he took measures to get Hoover’s problems were not lightened by the 
credit flowing again. But none of this kept generally unfriendly Congress that convened 
unemployment from sticking at between three in December. But in response to disastrous 
and four million. Businessmen were clearly be- bank failures abroad, Hoover was at least able 
coming convinced, despite Hoover’s public in July 1931 to declare a moratorium on the 
optimism, that new investment outlays were payment of debts foreign governments owed 
unwise. And as drought intensified the stress the United States. That December, he suc- 
on farmers and the banks that served them, a ceeded in establishing a system of home-loan 
huge wave of bank failures began to roll, closing banks to provide easy financing for home build- 
more than six hundred banks by the end of the ing. Meanwhile, he had worked out the Recon- 
year. struction Finance Corporation. Approved in
By the autumn of 1930, Americans were January 1932, the RFC was intended to stim- 
sufficiently shaken to vote Republican con- ulate economic activity and put some of the
Herbert Hoover—with Kitty Dalton of the Knights of Columbus—inspects relief supplies bound for 
Europe s starving children, January 24, 1921 (Underwood and Underwood photo; courtesy Herbert 
Hoover Presidential Library)
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jobless back to work by making money avail­
able through loans to insurance companies, 
banks, farm organizations, state and local 
governments, and other institutions. In the 
winter of 1931-1932, Hoover drew millions of 
bushels of wheat and tens of thousands of bales 
of cotton from Farm Board surpluses to be 
converted into flour and cloth and distributed 
by the Red Cross to those in need. Billions of 
dollars were spent on public works and billions 
more advanced on credit. By then, unemploy­
ment had risen to more than eleven million.
Hoover’s relief and assistance program was 
based on voluntary cooperation; when 
government intervened directly, emphasis was 
on the temporary nature of this emergency 
assistance. Hoover was opposed in principle to 
the dole. He was convinced that voluntarism 
would work, that Americans would voluntarily 
provide what other Americans, for the time 
being, were without. After all, why should he 
abandon an approach that he believed was right 
and that he knew worked? As an orphaned 
child, he and his parents’ families had exem pif­
fled it, and in Belgium and elsewhere after 
World War I he had made it work. So this man, 
“enormously capable and efficient’’ in the 
words of a not especially sympathetic historian, 
Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., jawboned worried 
bankers, suspicious business leaders, angry 
labor groups, and a recalcitrant Congress and 
got them to agree to many measures that he 
thought would get the country back on an even 
keel.
Did he achieve success? A few historians and 
journalists have thought so. Walter Lippman 
was one: “Hoover [and his aides] had hold of 
the essence of the matter in the Spring of 1932 
when they forced a reflation policy on the fed­
eral reserve system. Believe it or not, they
arrested the depression.”
Believe it or not. The American electorate in
November 1932 did not believe it, and they 
voted out the Hoover administration resound­
ingly. The President carried only six states, not
including Iowa. If there had been any hope in 
the spring of 1932 that the outlook would be 
better, it had been dashed by March of 1933. 
When H oover left the White House, 
unemployment had reached the staggering fig­
ure of 15,071,000—one-third of the nation’s 
work force.
Where had Hoover failed as a provider? 
Lippman’s comment is revealing, for it implies 
what Hoover seems to have believed: that the 
Depression was merely a technical monetary 
problem. Hoover was loath to put the full force 
of the federal government into a fight, relying 
instead on voluntarism. In short, many say, he 
failed to recognize the scope of the disaster 
confronting him. On the other hand, Rexford 
Tugwell, a leading member of the Roosevelt 
brain trust, has said that “practically the whole 
New Deal was extrapolated from programs 
Hoover started.’ This is an exaggeration, yet it 
is true that Hoover was often blamed for ideas 
and measures similar to those for which Roose­
velt was praised. For example, critics jeered 
when Hoover contended that a good deal of the 
trouble was psychological, but when FDR de­
clared that “We have nothing to fear but fear 
itself! the same critics praised both his percep­
tiveness and his eloquence.
Hoover, exhausted and bitter, stayed out of 
public life for a year or so after his defeat, but by 
1935 New Deal measures had sufficiently out­
raged him that he returned to the political 
wars. In 1936 he was interested in the GOP 
nomination, which may have seemed a prize 
worth having, since anti-Roosevelt outcries in 
the news media suggested that the New Deal 
was vulnerable. But Alfred Landon was nomi­
nated and then beaten even more decisively 
than Hoover had been four years earlier.
During FDR’s second term, Hoover stayed 
active politically. He blasted the attempt to 
pack the Supreme Court, of course, and 
fought against various New Deal moves that 
struck him as not only immoral and wrong­
headed but unsuccessful—and, indeed,
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Herbert Hoover, June 1936, as seen by a car­
toonist from the New York Herald-Tribune 
(courtesy Herbert Hoover Presidential Li­
brary)
unemployment did remain distressingly high 
throughout the decade. In 1938 Hoover went 
abroad, returning to blast Nazism but also to 
speak against American intervention in the 
approaching war. Apparently unmindful of his 
continuing unpopularity among much of the 
public, he hoped to be nominated by his party 
in 1940, though he could scarcely have failed to 
notice that for years Democratic campaigners 
had been attacking Hoover and ‘his’ Depres­
sion more than the actual Republican can- 
didat es. But when Wendell Willkie was 
nominated and then defeated in Roosevelt s 
third-term victory, Hoover must have known
that, at the age of sixty-six, his hopes for elec­
tive office were over.
After Pearl Harbor, Hoover supported 
America’s war effort wholeheartedly. Early in 
1946, now in old age and a widower, he was 
asked to perform public service again. Presi­
dent Truman sent him around the world to 
surv ey and plan against the threatening post­
war famine. In 1947, Truman appointed him 
chairman of the Commission on Organization 
of the Executive Branch of the Government, 
which became better known as the Hoover 
Commission after its work was completed in 
1955. Then Hoover retired, though he con­
tinued to lecture and write virtually until his 
death on October 20, 1964.
A s Hoovers career plunged to its nadir in the 1930s, John L. Lewis’s career reached its zenith. The two men had 
much in common. Hoover the manager and 
Lewis the labor leader did not hold basically 
different economic views. Lewis never ques­
tioned the principle of free enterprise, though 
he wanted a larger slice of the pie for the 
workingman. Lewis supported Hoover in 1928 
and, as we have seen, was rebuffed when he 
made himself available for political appoint­
ment. But, astonishingly, he then backed 
Hoover in 1932, though historians believe he 
hedged his bets a bit. In personality, the men 
were reverse images of each other. Hoover, 
reserved in public, is said to have blossomed 
among small groups. Lewis, by contrast, seems 
to have been shy in intimate circumstances, 
but in public he became a burly, beetle- 
browed Glendower calling metaphors from the 
vasty deep to sway the American public as no 
other labor leader has before or since.
But in 1930 Lewis and his miners were in 
serious trouble. U\1W membership was sink­
ing below the 80,000 mark, and union-set daily 
minimums of $6.10 to $7.50 were fast be­
coming unenforceable. In 1931 Lewis urged 
Hoover in vain to use the federal government
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in the mass production industries, the Amer­
ican labor movement now faced its greatest 
organizing opportunity in history.
At the AFL convention in Atlantic City in 
October, a raging debate developed over 
whether to give AFL charters to emergent 
unions in the mass industries, with Lewis argu­
ing in favor. The debate culminated in a fist- 
fight between Lewis and the president of the 
AFL carpenters. Lewis won the fight, lost the 
convention vote, and went on two weeks later 
to form and become president of the Commit­
tee for Industrial Organization. While AFL 
conservatives busied themselves drawing up 
ultimata demanding the CTO’s dissolution, 
Lewis helped new CIO-affiliated unions win 
contracts in such mass industries as automobile 
and rubber manufacturing. Then he launched a 
giant organizing drive in steel. The demands 
for CIO dissolution were ignored.
The 1936 presidential campaign saw Lewis 
working vigorously for Roosevelt, and many 
feel that FDR’s landslide win over Landon was 
in part a triumph for Lewis as well. The year 
1937 started off brilliantly for Lewis and the 
CIO; they achieved contracts with General 
Motors and U.S. Steel, the giants of the auto 
and steel industries. Union membership dou­
bled in 1937, with most of the new members 
belonging to CIO affiliates. CIO unions now 
had a larger membership than the AFL. In The 
Nation the CTO was called “the most progres­
sive and vital force in American life today.” 
Later in 1937, however, the CIO was repulsed 
in its efforts to organize the smaller steel com­
panies, known as “Little Steel.” An angry 
Roosevelt called down a plague on both parties, 
and his criticism of labor and Lewis contributed 
to the split that later developed between the 
two men. The next year the CIO broke entirely 
with the AFL and held a constitutional conven­
tion in which Lewis was again chosen presi­
dent.
In the next couple of years Lewis, nursing his 
grievance against the President following the
John L. Lewis tells a Senate committee that 
labor must have the right to organize, 1933 
(Harris and Ewing photo; courtesy U.S. De­
partment of Labor)
Little Steel episode, also found other reasons to 
turn cool toward FDR. The “Roosevelt 
Depression of the late 1930s was a nagging 
worry for labor. And Lewis, sure that American 
involvement in a war would be costly for labor s 
hard-won gains, threw all his influence on the 
side of peace for the United States, crying out 
against Roosevelt s moves toward intervention.
All this seems sufficient to have caused 
Lewis’s bitter opposition to FDR’s third-term 
candidacy, though a more interesting explana­
tion is the dubious story told by Frances Per­
kins, FDR s secretary of labor, who has as­
serted that Lewis baldly pushed his own name 
at Roosevelt as a vice-presidential candidate 
and, when turned down, sought revenge. His­
torians Dubofsky and Van Tine point out that 
Lewis’s vanity was not likely to permit his lay­
ing himself open to such a rejection. For what­
ever reason, Lewis urged labor to vote for 
Willkie in 1940, vowing to resign as CTO presi­
dent if Roosevelt won. FDR did win, handily, 
and Lewis did resign.
. r V • . * , I *0
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The decade of the Forties was not the 
triumphal march for Lewis that most of the 
Thirties had been. Of course, he remained as 
president of the miners, leading them to 
significant gains in the decade that saw Amer­
ica’s involvement in World War II and its 
aftermath. Frequent walkouts before, during, 
and after the war made Lewis a formidable 
problem for Roosevelt and his successor, Tru­
man, and may have made him, as some said, 
“the most hated man in America.’ No matter; 
obloquy rolled off Lewis’s broad back—off the 
back of the public Lewis, at least—and did not 
deflect him from his goals. In 1941 the miners 
won a union-shop ruling in the steel industry’s 
company-owned coal mines. In 1943 they 
gained the equivalent of portal-to-portal pay. 
And in 1946 they won welfare and retirement 
funds and a variety of improvements in working 
conditions. On the other hand, they and Lewis 
were troubled by mechanization in the coal 
mines and competition from other fuels, both 
of which reduced mine employment and thus 
led to declining U\1W membership.
In the 1950s Lewis, now in his seventies, 
found the world passing him by, though honors 
came his way. In 1956 he was paid homage at 
the Beckley, West Virginia dedication of a 
group of hospitals that the miners money had 
built, and he was honored, too, by Georgetown 
University and Iowa’s Buena Vista College. 
W hen he resigned as UMW president in 1960, 
he received messages of affection from both 
rank-and-file miners and establishment greats, 
including Herbert Hoover. Despite failing 
health, he survived, outliving most of his asso­
ciates and family—his wife, his daughter Kath­
ryn, his brothers and sisters. His son and 
grandchildren were virtually estranged from 
him.
In the years before his death on June 11, 
1969, he was a lonely man. But in his lifetime 
he had seen the American workingman make 
giiins unprecedented in the country’s history. 
Lewis had provided the leadership that
John L. Lewis, age seventy-one, inspects dam­
age caused by a mine explosion in West 
Frankfort, Illinois, 1951. One hundred nine­
teen miners died in the blast, (courtesy United 
Mine Workers Journal)
brought his coal miners a living wage, reason­
able hours, and some protection against the 
vicissitudes of desperately hard and often dead­
ly jobs. Sometimes berated as a revolutionary, 
he was actually the foe of revolutionaries. He 
simply wanted a society in which prosperity 
was widely shared, in which laboring 
people—by organized power—could obtain
high wages to spend on the products of capital­
ism.
A s the decade of the Thirties opened, Henry A. Wallace was engrossed in editing Wallaces' Farmer and in con­
ducting his seed business, and he was scoring 
successes in both. It was in August 1932 that he
*  t 0 V.y ) n < (  . i a M n u , U i
Yicc-prcsulcntial caiuluiatc Henry A. Wallace <lu rinvilir c<impninn of I'MUl hcttmann 
Archive)
ôiPrÿ-îft: ti'. tt i
Ik Wv' > v  <
;s\
* v * ' . w  i
: | 4 p
r :  ■ l l \
a ü $ 1
met Franklin Roosevelt for the first time, and Congress passed new legislation to enable Wal- 
he was impressed by the candidate s vigor, lace to keep his programs going. One of Sec- 
humor, and knowledge of agriculture. And the retary Wallace's last projects, in 1939, was to 
Iowa editor impressed the candidate as well, establish the food-stamp program, using agri- 
FDR appointed Wallace secretary of agri- cultural surpluses to improve the well-being of 
culture—an appointment that surprised those American society as a whole, 
who forecast such matters. Wallace told the Wallace left his mark on the Department of 
readers of Wallaces Fanner that he was going Agriculture; after his tenure it would never be 
to Washington under “a chief who is definitely the same. Under him, as Frank Freidel has 
progressive, entirely sympathetic toward agri- remarked, “national planning in the area of 
culture” and “a courageous man with a kindly agriculture became accepted federal policy.” 
heart. He was able to implement the idea that he and
By all accounts, Wallace, green as June corn his father had proposed as early as 1912: that 
to the ways oi Washington at the beginning, government warehouses should be built to 
grew in the job. His path was predictably store grain withheld from the market in years of 
bumpy. When the controversial Agricultural plenty and to release it when lean years ar-
Adjustment Act was implemented, Iowa’s Milo ™  ^  ^  , |M1H
Reno, the Farm Holiday radical, called it dia- ^  i V * L ^  N V VSw \
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Henry A. Wallace, plant breeder. Wallaces 
experiments with hybridization led to the 
formation of the Pioneer Hi-Bred Corn Com- 
pany of Des Moines, a leader in the 
twentieth-century revolution in corn produc­
tion techniques. (courtesy University of Iowa 
Library)
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rived. Wallace termed this “the Joseph Plan 
and later “the ever-normal granary, charac­
teristically drawing his first title from the Book 
of Genesis and his second from the writings of 
Confucius, which he had studied in the Des 
M oines Public Library. School lunches were a 
brainchild of Agriculture under Wallace. He 
seemed often to have the needy in mind—the 
marginal farmer, the sharecropper. Later, dur­
ing World War II, he is reported to have ex­
plained half-seriously to the wife of the Soviet 
ambassador: “The object of this war is to make 
sure that everybody in the world has the privi­
lege of drinking a quart of milk a day. Though 
not always in tune with the politics of Iowa, 
Henry Wallace was perhaps the most basically 
Iowan of our four leaders in his approach to 
providing life’s necessities to his fellow man.
When Wallace left the Department of Agri­
culture in 1940, it was because wider horizons 
beckoned. During the 1930s he had dem­
onstrated not only administrative talent but 
political promise. In 1939 he was one of a 
number of cabinet people with legitimate 
presidential ambitions who were, however, 
quite willing to defer to the plans of FDR as 
commander-in-chief. Who among this group 
first publicly called for a third term for Roose­
velt is a matter of debate, but Wallace was at 
least one of the first, in January 1940. He had 
demonstrated loyalty, as in the Supreme 
Court-packing fight in 1937. But he had also 
demonstrated independence, as in his support 
of some conservative Democratic senators, in­
cluding Guy Gillette of Iowa, whom Roosevelt 
wanted to defeat in the 1938 primaries. Gil­
lette’s victory enhanced Wallace’s prestige. 
For these and other reasons, he became a lead­
ing candidate for the vice-presidential nomina­
tion. The clincher, no doubt, was that Roose­
velt then thought of him as a man capable of 
taking over as president.
So Roosevelt forced through Wallace’s 
nomination, and when that ticket was elected 
over Willkie and Charles McNary in 1940, Wal-
Henry Wallace greets reporters as he leaves 
meeting with President Harry Truman, Sep­
tember 18, 1946. Truman had hoped to silence 
his secretary of commerce on matters related 
to foreign affairs. When Wallace proved re­
luctant, Truman demanded his resignation. 
(courtesy University of Iowa Library)
lace himself and others must have regarded the 
Iowan as heir apparent. But things turned sour 
for him. His far-sighted views on how the post­
war world should be molded were no doubt an 
irritant to Roosevelt’s wartime pragmatism. A 
worse irritant was a bitter public clash between 
Wallace, as chairman of the Board of Economic
Warfare, and Commerce Secretary Jesse 
Jones, as chairman of the Reconstruction Fi­
nance Corporation, over the failure to meet 
priorities in raw materials. Roosevelt resorted 
to his plague-on-both-your-houses approach: 
Wallace and Jones lost their chairmanships, 
and the Board of Economic Warfare was re­
organized under a man sympathetic to Jones. 
From that time on, Robert Sherwood has writ­
ten, White House insiders knew that Wallace 
was no longer the anointed. When Roosevelt 
ran for a fourth term, he ran with Senator Harry 
Iruman, who became president upon FDR s 
death.
In 1945 Wallace may have derived some 
satisfaction from replacing Jones as secretary of 
commerce, but even there his days were 
numbered. He was fired by Truman in Sep­
tember 1946 for public utterances too friendly 
to Russia. After a stint as editor of the New 
Republic, Wallace became the presidential 
candidate of the Progressive party, which op­
posed the Marshall Plan and called for dis­
armament and accommodation with the 
U.S.S.R. The ticket failed to carry any state, 
though its popularity in New York permitted 
Thomas E. Dewey to defeat Truman there, and 
thus to make the GOP look like the victor 
nationally for a few hours after the polls had 
closed on the East Coast.
Becoming disenchanted with his Progressive 
associates, Wallace quit the party in 1950 and 
later repudiated his sympathy with Russian 
aims. In his last years, withdrawing from poli­
tics, he returned to his Pioneer Hi-Bred Corn 
business. He died on November 18, 1965 in 
Danbury, Connecticut, and is buried in Glen­
dale Cemetery in Des Moines.
I n 1930 the youngest of our four leaders, Harry Hopkins, was doing two men s jobs in New York City. In the early 
months of the Depression, his boss at the Asso­
ciation for Improving the Condition of the 
Poor, William Mathews, secured $70,000 from
the Bed Cross to pay for emergency jobs, and 
Hopkins was assigned to do what his enemies 
always maintained he did best: spending other 
people’s money. The original $70,000 didn’t 
last long, but Mathews managed to continue 
Hopkins’ funding until August 1931, when 
then Governor Franklin Roosevelt established 
the Temporary Emergency Relief Administra­
tion. The supposedly temporary nature of this 
agency discouraged some people who might 
have worked for it, but when Hopkins had a 
chance to become deputy in charge, he ac­
cepted quickly. Soon he became TERA’s top 
administrator. He got to know the governor, as 
well as people who would later become impor­
tant in Washington, people like Frances Per­
kins and Henry Morgenthau, Jr. Always more 
comfortable in two full-time jobs than one,
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President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Harry 
Hopkins enjoy a holiday cruise aboard the 
USS Houston, October 1935. (courtesy 
Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library)
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Hopkins became involved in supporting 
Roosevelt’s try for the 1932 presidential nomi­
nation, which was being astutely and, it turned 
out, successfully directed by James Farley.
Hopkins was called from Albany to Washing­
ton in May 1933 to head the Federal Emer­
gency Relief Administration, a project he had 
done as much as any individual to design. It is 
said that he spent more than $5 million in his 
first two hours in office, dispatching relief funds 
to governors of six states, including Iowa. Hop­
kins kept on top of the program nationwide by 
consulting with field representatives and by 
close personal attention to the states’ priority 
proposals. He saw to it that states paid their 
share of relief costs, using the threat of with­
holding federal funds, for example, to blud­
geon the Illinois legislature into passing a state 
sales tax to generate needed state revenues.
During the grim winter of 1933-1934 Hop­
kins showed his skills as an improviser and 
expediter. When the Federal Emergency Re­
lief Administration proved unequal to some 
relief problems, he and Roosevelt worked out 
plans for the Civil Works Administration. To 
provide the $400 million necessary to start pay­
ing the workers, Harold Ickes was persuaded to 
make funds available from the unpaid balance 
of his Public Works Administration. The CWA 
was established in early November. Hopkins 
had nearly two million men and women at work 
by December and more than four million by 
January. Roosevelt, hearing cries about abuses 
in the program, sent his longtime friend Frank 
Walker to check it out. Walker reported that 
Hopkins was doing “a magnificent job.” He was 
handling both the FERA and the CWA, but he 
was approaching physical exhaustion.
Roosevelt sent Hopkins to Europe, osten­
sibly to rest, but while there he observed how 
much further Europe had gone than the United 
States in matters of government social assis­
tance, and he returned determined to institute 
a permanent work-relief program. After New 
Deal Democrats smote most of their enemies
in the congressional elections of 1934 (during 
which Hopkins made his debut as a political 
speech writer), the time seemed ripe: in 1935 
the Work Relief bill was passed, and FDR in­
stalled himself as titular head of the compli­
cated relief structure, with Ickes in charge of a 
huge and high-sounding advisory committee as 
well as the PWA, and Hopkins heading the 
Works Progress Administration, which got 
most of the work done. Washington found the 
infighting between Ickes and Hopkins fascinat­
ing. When Ickes won the point that the WPA 
should be limited to projects costing less than 
$25,000, Hopkins’ answer was to divide large 
projects into enough smaller ones to bring the 
cost of each below the critical sum.
So Hopkins enjoyed both intramural and 
extramural victories. But in 1935 he was 
afflicted with an ulcer. From then on, his 
enormous quantity of work was accomplished 
by a frail man whose cumulative illnesses were 
to kill him in a little more than ten years. 
Recovering from the ulcer, Hopkins was deso­
lated by the ultimately fatal illness of his second 
wife, Barbara, who died in 1937. Hopkins him­
self underwent cancer surgery within three 
months after her death.
But his WPA work went well, gaining him 
the ever firmer regard of the President and the 
ever greater antagonism of his political foes. In 
the floods and droughts of the mid-1930s, the 
WPA was invaluable, but it also became the 
target of strong criticism for waste and graft. 
Hopkins was able to defend the organization 
pretty well against the graft charge; as to waste, 
that was so strongly colored by political views 
that no explanations could change any minds on 
the subject. In 1937, wars in Spain and China 
presaged a shift in emphasis in America from 
national to international events, but that year s 
recession kept Hopkins’ attention at home. He 
and others convinced Roosevelt early in 1938 
that recovery demanded renewed government 
spending, and a relief package of nearly $5 
billion was drawn up. Roosevelt thought that
Harry Hopkins meets the press to an­
nounce his a\rpoii\tmcnt as President 
Franklin D. Roosevelt's personal rep­
resentative to England, January 1941 
(Culver Pictures)
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(right) Representatives of the Allied nations meet at 
Tehran, November 28-December 1, 1943 to discuss 
strategy for the defeat of the Axis powers. (left to 
right) General George Marshall, Sir Archibald 
Clark Kerr, Harry Hopkins, interpreter M. Parlov, 
Josef Stalin, and Foreign Minister V. Molotov (courte­
sy Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library)
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he needed a Congress more sympathetic to his 
aims and tried to purge his party of conserva­
tives, so Hopkins worked in Iowa for the 
nomination of Otha Wearin for senator but, as 
we have seen, Cuy Gillette was the winner and 
subsequently retained his senatorial seat. Now 
Hopkins began attending cabinet meetings as a 
kind of minister without portfolio. Clearly, he 
was the most powerful man in the adminis­
tration next to Roosevelt.
Late in 1938 he was relieved as WPA 
administrator and appointed secretary of com­
merce, as FDR moved to groom Hopkins as his 
successor in the White House. Biographer 
Henry H. Adams says that Hopkins considered 
buying a farm in Iowa to meet residency 
requirements there, though his official resi­
dence was then in New York. He did lease a 
farm, near Grinnell, and about that time be­
came a trustee of Grinnell College. But illness 
struck again in 1939—so severely that he was 
unable to function as commerce secretary and 
saw his presidential ambitions fade away. He 
was virtually bedridden all summer and fall. As 
the Thirties ended, Hopkins was so sick and 
depressed that he sometimes talked about 
places where he might go to “end his days.”
Had Hopkins in fact ended his days—or at 
least his working days— in 1939, he would still 
have been one of the most influential men of his 
generation. As much as any one man, he 
implemented the welfare state in America. 
What Hopkins provided in the 1930s was jobs. 
His creed was simple: if people need work, it 
should be made available to them, and in his
view government, particularly the federal 
government, could do that better than any 
other institution. Hopkins saw to it that gov­
ernment did, at a total cost of some $9 billion. f 
Afterwards, his friends and foes agreed on at 
least one point: not a penny ever stuck to Hop- I 
kins’ fingers.
In the spring of 1940 Hopkins, still very sick, I 
came to dinner at the White House and, like 
the main character in a popular play of the . 
period, stayed on and on as a houseguest— 
three and a half years in Hopkins’ case. He 
resigned as secretary of commerce and became 
something unofficial and infinitely more impor­
tant—perhaps executive officer, or assistant 
president, or eminence grise, or FDR’s alter
ego. \\ hatever he was, he was in a position for 
which he was uniquely qualified. Unawed by 
Roosevelt or by anyone else, he could intelli­
gently and toughly argue matters of the great­
est moment, then subside and throw all his 
energies into carrying out presidential orders 
when policy had been decided. For instance, 
economic recovery came as the country tooled 
up to become the arsenal of democracy, and 
Hopkins—no more an economic theorist than 
was Roosevelt—did not worry about the source 
of jobs if jobs were there. So he was quite 
ieady, in Roosevelt s terminology, to abandon 
Dr. New Deal in favor of Dr. Win-the-War.
W inning the war is what occupied Hopkins 
foi the remaining years of his active life. With
his presidential ambitions dashed and his 
health shattered, he began the 1940s with dim 
personal prospects. Yet he was the only one of 
our four Iowans for whom the decade was to 
bring genuine triumph. In 1940 he worked 
tirelessly to get Wallace nominated vice-presi­
dent, then to get the Roosevelt-Wallace ticket 
elected. This accomplished, America s effort to 
help the beleaguered Allies in Europe began in 
earnest. To start with, Hopkins handled Lend 
Lease. He had a marvelous ability to perceive 
Roosevelt s thinking, so that when he was run­
ning a project it was the same as if the President 
himself were in charge. Then Hopkins served 
as a liaison with Great Britain, and after the 
United States entered the war, he not only 
interpreted America’s positions to Churchill, 
Stalin, and Chiang Kai-shek but also helped 
determine those positions. Churchill in those 
years is said to have considered him one of the 
six most influential people on the face of the 
earth.
He was an indispensable aide to the Presi­
dent in the planning of the Great Powers vic­
tory strategy at Tehran. Then, early in 1945, 
came the Yalta Conference. Hopkins, though 
ill—as Roosevelt was also—again served as aide 
to the President in efforts to work out a blue­
print for lasting peace. Roosevelt died on April 
12, not long after his return home, with victory 
over Germany imminent. Hopkins left 
government service on May 12, but he was 
called back and dispatched to Moscow to try to 
bring the Russians back to participation in the 
San Francisco Conference to establish the 
United Nations. In this, his last government 
mission, Hopkins established some American 
aims and no doubt did better than anyone else 
could have. On July 2, 1945, he resigned for 
good. That autumn, illness prevented his going 
abroad to receive an honorary degree at Ox­
ford. In November he went to the hospital, and 
he died there on January 29, 1946.
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